Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1992

Albertsons, INC. v. Board of Review of the
Industrial Commission : Addenda
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
John S. Chindlund; Robert S. Wing; Roger J. McConkie; Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler; Attorneys for
Petitioner.
Winston M. Faux; Assistant Attorney General; Attorney for Board of Review; Gayle M. Fullerton.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Albertsons, INC v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission, No. 920530 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/3499

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COURT OF A

ALBERTSCrk
Dratioi.

;''., an idabo
Ca
Petitioner,,

BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION,

ADDENDUM TO BRIEF
WRIT OF REVIEW TO THE
BOARD OF REVIEW Or' THE
UTAH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

WINSTON M. FAUX
Assistant Attorney Genera..
140 East 300 South
P.O. Box 11100
Salt Lake City, r'r' ='""
(801) 533-2510
Attorney for Board on Review

FN
•;:-:R

J .

•

Y
': ••>' C e n t
'HCE,

j

-Last
1; Lake
•-;>

Gayle M. Fullerton
7669 South Sunrise Place
West Jordan, UT 84084

S.'C

'.- -;RT G .

524

•xrneys

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ALBERTSONS, INC., an Idaho
corporation

Case No. 920530-CA

Petitioner,
v.
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION,

Priority No. 7

Respondent.
ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF PETITIONER
WRIT OF REVIEW TO THE
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE
UTAH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

WINSTON M. FAUX
Assistant Attorney General
140 East 300 South
P.O. Box 11100
Salt Lake City, UT 84147
(801) 533-2510
Attorney for Board of Review
Gayle M. Fullerton
7669 South Sunrise Place
West Jordan, UT 84084

JOHN S. CHINDLUND
ROBERT G. WING
ROGER J. MCCONKIE
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East 400 South

Salt Lake City, Utah
(801) 524-1000
Attorneys for Petitioner

BOARD OF REVIEW
The Industrial Camiission of Utah
Unemployment Compensation Appeals

SMiyil/ERT/cd

GAYIE M. FUI1ERT0N
S.S.A. No. 528-11-6899

DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY

:
:

Case No. 92-A-3239

:

DECISION

:

Case No. 92-BR-241

:

The enplqyer, Albertsons, Inc., appeals the decision of the
Administrative law Judge in the above-entitled matter which held that the
claimant, Gayle M. Fullerton, had been discharged frxxn his employment with
the enplqyer for reasons that are not disqualifying under Section
35-4-5(b)(l) of the Utah Employment Security Act.
The A U ' s decision,
therefore, allowed payment of unemployment benefits to the claimant effective
April 5, 1992, and oDntinuing, provided he is otherwise eligible. The ALJ's
decision also held the employer liable for benefit charges pursuant to
Section 35-4-7 (c) of the Act.
After careful consideration of the record in this matter, the
Board of Review finds the decision of the Administrative Law Judge to be a
correct application of the provisions of the Utah Employment Security Act,
supported by corpetent evidence and, therefore, affirms the decision. In so
holding, the Board of Review adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of
law of the Administrative Law Judge.
The employer argues on appeal that the ALJ erred in finding the
claimant slipped and broke the battery plate accidentally.
The enplqyer
further argues that a thorough review of the record reveals that the
employer's witness, Mr. Ellis, was more credible than the claimant.
In affirming the decision of the Administrative Law Judge, the
Board of Review notes that the enplqyer is correct in its argument that this
case hinges on balancing the respective credibility of Mr. Ellis and the
claimant. The ALJ, who had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of both
witnesses, made a specific finding that the claimant "seems more credible to
the Administrative Law Judge."
The Board of Review only reviews written
transcripts and documents associated with the Administrative Law Judge
hearing and does not have the opportunity to observe witnesses. The Board
must, therefore, rely on the impressions of the ALJ on matters of credibility
derived from deserving
the demeanor of the witnesses.
Since the

GAYI£ M. FULLERTON
S.S.A. No. 528-11-6899
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Case No. 92-A-3239
Case No. 92-ER-241

Administrative Law Judge found the claiitant to be more believable than the
enployer witness and since the A U ' s finding of fact that the claiitant
accidentally slipped and inadvertently broke the battery plate is supported
by substantial cotpetent evidence in the record, the Board affirms that
finding and affirms the Administrative Law Judge's decision that the enployer
did not have just cause within the meaning of the Utah Btplqyment Security
Act for discharging the claimant.
This decision becanes final on the date it is mailed, and any
further appeal must be made within 30 days fron the date of mailing.
Your
appeal mast be submitted in writing to the Utah Court of Appeals, Midtcwn
Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. To file an
appeal with the Court of Appeals, you must suixnit to the Clerk of the Court a
Petition for Writ of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to
Section 63-46b-16 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and Rule 14 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, followed by a Docketing Statement and
a Legal Brief as required by Rules 9 and 24-27, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

/s/
/s/

Stephen M. Hadley
Thatas L. Lewis

Although the Administrative Law Judge made a specific finding
regarding the respective credibility of the claimant and Mr. Ellis, my
reading of the record persuades me that Mr. Ellis' version of the incident
leading to the claimants discharge is more trustworthy than the claimant's
and I would overrule the A U ' s finding that
the
claimant was more
credible than Mr. Ellis.
Mr. Ellis had no apparent advantage to be gained by saying the
claiitant repeatedly and willfully beat on the battery plate. The claimant in
fact testified that he and Mr. Ellis got along well and no motive is
suggested in the record why Mr. Ellis would lie. When asked if he could
have been mistaken about what he saw, Mr. Ellis was steadfast in repeating
that the claimant was beating on the plate in frustration, not just trying to
The claiitant on the other hand, when
regain his balance after a fall.
accused of beating on the employer's property, had everything to gain by
claiming he slipped and accidentally damaged the battery plate.
The
claimant's account is further thrcwi into question because of his claim two
years earlier that he accidentally slipped and broke a door jam when he was
kicking at a door while horsing around.
I find the claimant's repeated
excuse of "slipping" when others reported more willful behavior to be
suspicious.

GAYIE M. KJLLERTCN
S.S.A. No, 528-11-6899
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Case No. 92-ER-241

Mr.
Ellis' version of the event leading to the claimant's
discharge has not varied from the time he first reported it. He has asserted
from the beginning that he saw the claimant beat numerous tines in
frustration on the battery plate. The ALJ minimized Mr. Ellis' observation
by making a finding that Mr. Ellis was unable to see the claimant's feet and
so could not see if the claimant was falling.
Mr. Ellis' testimony,
however, was that though he iromentarily could not see the claimant's feet,
the claimant was not falling, but was clearly beating on the battery plate
in anger evidenced by the fact that the claimant struck the battery plate
again and threatened Mr. Ellis after he told him to stop.
The claimant admitted he hit the battery plate at least twice.
This version seems inherently inconsistent to me as to hit the plate twice
would have meant he slipped and fell twice upon the battery plate. This is
not the claimant's testimony. He testified rather that he slipped once, then
stood up, and hit the plate with his hand. This story does not ring true to
me ard is not at all consistent with the observations of Mr. Ellis. For
these reasons, I would overrule the Administrative Law Judge's finding of
fact that the employer's property was damaged accidentally by the claimant.
Furthermore, I disagree with the Administrative law Judge's
conclusions about the inappropriateness of the employer referencing past
infractions of the claimant in arriving at its conclusion to discharge the
claimant. The union contract provided that employee warning notices will not
remain in effect for more than one year. The infraction for which the
claimant was discharged, willful destruction of ccnpany property, was grounds
for immediate dismissal under the employer's rules. There was no need on the
part of the employer to go through any step-by-step disciplinary procedure in
the face of the claimant's actions and they did not do so. Referencing his
past behavior of Jacking in a door was not necessary to sustain a discharge
but only adds strength to the enployer's argument that this was an employee
who exercised marginal control over his temper and who the employer might
reasonably expect to see repeat destructive behavior. By referencing the
claimant's past behavior the employer established both the elements of
knowledge and harm as required to make a finding of just cause under the Utah
Employment Security Act.
For these reasons, I dissent fron the majority
opinion and would reverse the decision of the Administrative Law Judge that
the claimant was not discharged for just cause and that the employer is
chargeable for benefits paid in connection with this claim.
/s/

Lawrence Disera

JOARD
RD OF
0FAREVI<
REVIEW

Dated this 27th day of July, 1992.
Date Mailed:

July 30, 1992.

1HE INDUSTRIAL COtOSSKll CF l / M
DEPARDfEKT OF BOWHMEKT SHXKEIY
APPEALS TRIBUNAL
DBCTSICN OF AEMINISn»TrVE IAW J U K E

Gayle M. Fullerton
7669 S Sunrise Place
West Jordan, UT 84084

DATE OF DECISION: April 29, 1992
APPEAL FILED:
ISSUES:

May 4, 1992

S.S.A. No.

528-11-6899

Case No.

992-A-03239

DATE OF HEARING:
PIACE OF HEARING:

35-4-5(b)(l), 35-4-7 (c)

June 1, 1992

Salt Lake City, Utah

APPEARANCES:

Claimant/Brployer

EFFECTIVE EftTE OF DENIAL: april 5, 1992

Unenplqyment insurance benefits were denied on the grounds the claimant was
dismissed for reasons which were disqualifying.
This decision relieved the
employer's benefit ratio account for benefits paid to the claimant.
Jurisdiction for this review is established in accordance with Section 35-46(c) of the Utah Employment Security Act and the Rules pertaining thereto.
Decision dated and mailed:

June 3 f 1992

The following decision will becxxne firal unless, within 30 days from the date of
this decision, further written appeal is made to the Board of Review (PO Box
11600, Salt Lake City, UT 84147) setting forth the grounds upon which the appeal
is made.
LLS/lg
cc:

Albertsons, Inc.
c/o Gibbens Company
Attn: Robert Watson
P.O. Box 7832
Salt Lake City, UT 84107

(Applicable Sections of the Utah Brnployment Security
Regulations are quoted on the following pages.

Act

and

Rules

and
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Gayle M. Fullerton

FINDINGS OF EftCT:
Prior to filing for unenployment benefits effective April 5, 1992, the claimant
earned $11.10 per hour working full-time as a forklift operator for Albertsons
where he was enployed fron April 5, 1981 to April 3, 1992. The claimant was
discharged fron this enployer for the reasons set forth as follows.
The cxmpany policy allows for the immediate dismissal of an employee who
willfully damages company property. The claimant was aware of the policy.
The union contract Albertsons has with Teamsters Local #222 provides that warning
notices an employee may receive will not remain in effect for more than one year.

The claimant received two warning notices. One was in April 1989 for operating
equipment in an unsafe manner.
The second was in January 1990 for willful
destruction of company property. Prior to April 1989, the claimant had received
no prior reprimands. On approximately April 19, 1989, the claimant had just
finished putting a pallet on a crcwn when another driver drove up beside him and
put a pallet beside his. This driver asked the claimant about a business matter.
In the course of the conversation, the claimant forgot he had not lowered the
forks. When he drove away and turned the corner, the forks caught on an object
which resulted in the forklift tipping over.
The claimant was placed on
suspension without pay frora April 20, 1989 to April 25, 1989. On January 31,
1990, the crew was leaving early. It was Superbcwl Sunday. The door to the time
clock was locked. The claimant and two others began "goofing around" by banging
on the door. The claimant kicked the door. He hit it harder than he expected.
A board by the doorknob cracked. The claimant estimated the cost of repair to be
$5.00.
The door did not open.
The claimant received two weeks suspension
without pay for the infraction.
On April 2, 1992, the claimant needed to change his lift trucks battery. The
claimant was a long term employee and had experience performing this task. The
batteries weighed fifteen hundred to eighteen hundred pounds. The batteries are
on rollers so they can be pushed out of the truck onto a truck like rack system
with rollers. In turn, the new battery moves off onto the truck cm rollers. A
heavy metal plate holds the battery in place. The process takes two people.
The claimant drove his reach truck along side of the battery rack. He asked the
maintenance person for a battery change.
While he was waiting for the
maintenance man, he removed the old battery. He had pushed the new battery into
the truck but was having difficulty securing it with the metal plate.
The
maintenance man was on the opposite side of the truck. In this position, the
maintenance man could not see the claimant's feet. The claimant slipped. When
he tried to regain his balance, the metal plate he had in his hand hit the lift
and chipped it. The maintenance man believed the claimant purposefully broke the
battery cover. The maintenance man told the claimant if he did that again he
would turn him in. The claimant responded to go ahead and turn him in and that
it would be the last thing he did. The claimant thought the maintenance man was
joking. Both perceived the other to be in a bad mood that day.
The maintenance man did report the claimant to his supervisor.
wrote:

In addition, he

528-11-6899
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Gayle M. Fullerton

On april 2, 1992 at the approximate time of 5:30 a.m. Gail
(sic) Fullerton asked for a battery. When I got out there he
had pushed his old battery out and his new one in and had
difficulty putting in the retaining plate for the battery and
started hitting the top plastic cover repeatedly, when I told
him to stop or I would turn him in he hit it one more time
and told me to go ahead he didnft give a shit. Then he told
me if I did I'd regret it.
Earl L. Ellis
4-2-92
Based on the maintenance persons account of what occurred, coupled with the past
reprimands, the company decided the claimant willfully broke the plastic battery
cover and discharged him. The claimant did tell the company the damage was not
intentionally.
REASONING AND OCNOUSION OF IAW:
The company did consider the past reprimands when deciding to discharge the
claimant. The 1989 and 1990 incidents were given no weight with respect to this
decision. The company violated its union agreement by adding these reprimands to
their decision to dismiss the claimant. Both incidents occunred over two years
ago, well outside the time limitation as per the union contract, for
consideration. Moreover, the 1989 occurrence was a one time isolated instance
due to inadvertence when the claimant became distracted. The 1990 mishap was the
result of horseplay. While the kicking of the door is not condoned, it was not
meant to be destructive.
The claimant and the maintenance man have scxne crucial differences in their
testimony with respect to the April 2, 1992 battery change. The maintenance man
testified the claimant beat the plastic battery cover repeatedly. He did not say
the claimant broke it, however. The claimant stated he did not break this cover
nor did he hit it. He contends it was broken before he went to the battery area.
The claimant asserts he lost his balance while changing the battery and, in this
process, the metal plate he was holding in his hand inadvertently hit the fork
lift. Inportantly, the maintenance man could not view the claimant's feet during
the entire process. While their testimony is different, the claimant seems more
credible to the Administrative Law Judge. Even if the credibility issue is not
considered, the weight of the evidence in a discharge case rests with the
employer. If the weight is equal, the scales tip to the claimant in a discharge
case.
Section 35-4-5 (b) (1) of the Utah Employment Security Act provides that a
claimant for unemployment insurance benefits is not eligible if he or she was
discharged from employment for just cause or an act or omission in connection
with the employment which was deliberate, willful or wanton and adverse to the
employer's rightful interests.
In order to support a denial of unemployment
insurance benefits, an enployer must establish by a preponderance of the
evidence the claimant was at fault in causing his or her own unemployment. That
is, the claimant mast be shewn to have had a substantial degree of control,
Thus, a
knowledge and culpability in the conduct resulting in discharge.
claimant will not generally be denied unemployment benefits where discharged for
mere inability, inefficiency, inadvertence or isolated incidents of good faith
error in iudament or ardinarv necfHcr^nnp-

528-11-6899
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Gayle M. Fullerton

The enployer did not establish by the preponderance of the evidence that the
claimants actions rose to the level of culpability, knowledge and ccxitrol to
impose a disqualification. The claimant's testimony is accepted that the damage
done on April 2, 1992 was accidental.
It is held he was discharged at the
convenience of the enployer but not for disqualifying just cause. Benefits are
awarded.
A ocMitributing enployer may be relieved of charges if an individual is separate
for reasons which are disqualifying.
Since the claimant was separated for
reasons which are not disqualifying, the enployer is not relieved of charges, for
the claim.
DECISION:
The decision of the adjudicator denying benefits pursuant to Section 35-4-5 (b) (1)
of the Utah Employment Security Act is reversed. Benefits are allowed effective
April 5, 1992 and continuing provided the claimant is otherwise eligible.
Albertsons is not relieved of charges for Gayle M. Fullerton pursuant to Section
35-4-7 (c) 3(C) of the Act.

La Vone Liddle^monal
^J^**
Administrative Law Judge
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY

R475-5a-8

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

a A claimant may have good cause for leaving if
the quit was due to discriminatory and unlawful sexual harassment, provided the emplover was given a
chance to take necessary action to alleviate the objectionable conduct Sexual harassment is a form of sex
discrimination which is prohibited by Title VII of the
U S Civil Rights Act Sexual harassment is intimidation by a person of either sex against a person of
the opposite or same sex. For sexual harassment to be
discrimination, the following three elements must be
shown to exist
(1) Unwanted conduct or communication of a sexual nature which aoverselv affects a person's employment relationship or working environment, if
(a) submission to the conduct is either an explicit
or implicit term or condition of employment, or
(b) submission to or rejection of the conduct is used
as a basis for an emplovment decision affecting the
person, or
ic) the conduct has a purpose or effect of substantially interfering with a person s work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work
environment,
(2) Unsolicited, deliberated sexual statements,
gestures or physical contacts which are objectionable
to the recipient,
(3) Undermines the integrity of the workplace, destrovs morale and offends legal and social standards
of acceptable behavior
b Inappropriate behavior which has sexual connotation but does not meet the test of sexual discrimination is insufficient to establish good cause for leaving
work
11 Discrimination
It is also a violation of Federal law to discriminate
against am individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of the individual s race, color, religion sex, or
national origin, or to limit, segregate, or classify employees in an> wa\ which would deprive or tend to
deprive an individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adverseh affect his status as an employee
because of the individual s race, color, religion, sex or
national origin
R475-5a-8. Effective Date of Disqualification.
1 The disqualification under this section technically begins with the week the claimant voluntarily
aui: the job However, to avoid the confusion which
arises when a disqualification is made for a period of
time prior to the filing of a claim, the claimant will be
notified that benefits are denied beginning with the
effective date of a new or reopened claim The disqualification continues until the claimant returns to
work in a bona fiae covered employment and earns
six times his weekly benefit amount after the week in
which the claimant left work A disqualification
which begins in one benefit year will continue into a
new benefit year unless purged by subsequent earnings
2 If an individual is receiving remuneration which
is attributed to a period of time following the last dav
of work, such as severance or vacation pay, the "week
in which the claimant left work" is considered to be
the last week for which such remuneration was attributable as an individual is not "unemployed" while
receiving remuneration from an employer, and such
severance or vacation pay cannot be used to purge a
disqualification

20

R475-5b. Discharge and Discharge for
Crime.
R475-5b-101 Discharge General Definition
R475-5b-102 Just Cause
R475-5b-103 Burden of Proof
R475-5b-104 Quit or Discharge
R475-5b-105 Disciplinary Suspension or Involuntary Furlough
R475-5b-106 Proximal Cause — Relation of Offenses
to Discharge
R475-5b-107 In Connection wTith Employment
R475-5b-108 Examples of Reasons for Discharge
R475-5b-109 Effective Date of Disqualification
R475-5b-201 Discharge for Crime — General Definition
R475-5b-202 In Connection with Work
R475-5b-203 Dishonest) or Other Disqualifying
Crimes
R475-5b-204 Admission or Conviction in a Court
R475-5b-205 Benefits Held in Abeyance
R475-5b-206 Disqualification Period
R475-5b-101. Discharge General Definition.
Ordinarily accepted concepts of justice are used in
determining if a discharge is disqualifying under the
"lust cause" provisions of the Act Just cause is defined as a iob separation that is necessarv due to the
seriousness of actual or potential harm to the emplover provided the claimant had knowledge of the
employer s expectations and had control over the circumstances which led to the discharge Just cause is
not established if the reason for the discharge is baseless arbitral-} or capricious or the emplover has
failed to uniformh appl> reasonable standards to all
emplovees when instituting disciphnarv action The
purpose of this section is to deny benefits to individuals who bring about their own unemployment bv
conducting themselves, with respect to their employment with callousness, misbehavior, or lack of consideration to such a degree that the emplover was justified m discharging the emplovee However, when an
emplovee is discharged b\ his emplover, such discharge may have been the result of incompetence,
lack of skill or other reasons which are bevond the
claimant's control The question which must be established bv the evidence i^ whether the claimant is at
fault in his resulting unemployment Unemployment
insurance benefits will be denied if the emplover had
lust cause for discharging the employee However, not
even cause for discharge proviaes a basis to deny
benefits In order to have just cause for discharge pursuant to Section 35-4-5(b)(l) there must be some fault
on the part of the employee involved
R475-5b-102. Just Cause.
1 The basic factors which establish just cause, and
are essential for a determination of ineligibility are
a Culpability
This is the seriousness of the conduct or the severity of the offense as it affects continuance of the employment relationship The discharge must have been
necessary to avoid actual or potential harm to the
employer's rightful interests A discharge would not
be considered ' necessary" if it is not consistent with
reasonable employment practices The wTongness of
the conduct must he considered in the context of the
particular employment and how it affects the employer s rights If the conduct was an isolated incident
of poor judgment and there is no exnectatinn thnt tKp

EMPLOYMENT SECURITY/JOB SERVICE
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may not be shown and therefore it is not necessary to
discharge the employee.
(1) Longevity and pnor work record are important
in determining if the act or omission is an isolated
incident or a good faith error in judgment. An employee who has historically complied with work rules
does not demonstrate by a single violation, even
though harmful, that such violations will be repeated
and therefore require discharge to avoid future harm
to the employer. For example: A long term employee
who does not have a history of tardiness or absenteeism is absent without leave for a number of days due
to a death in his immediate family. Although this is a
violation of the employer's rules and may establish
just cause for discharging a new employee, the fact
that the employee has established over a long period
of time that he complies with attendance rules shows
that the circumstance is more of an isolated incident
rather than a violation of the rules that is or could be
expected to be habitual In this case because the potential for harm to the employer is not shown, it is
not necessary for the employer to discharge the employee, and therefore just cause is not established
b Knowledge
The employee must have had a knowledge of the
conduct which the employer expected It is not necessary that the claimant intended to cause harm to the
employer, but he should reasonably have been able to
anticipate the effect his conduct would have Knowledge may not be established unless the employer
gave a clear explanation of the expected behavior or
had a pertinent written Dohcy, except in the case of a
flagrant violation of a universal standard of behavior.
If the employer's expectations are unclear, ambiguous or inconsistent, the existence of knowledge is
not shown. A specific warning is one way of showing
that the employee had knowledge of the expected conduct After the employee is given a warning he should
be given an opportunity to correct objectionable conduct. Additional violations occurring after the warning would be necessary to establish just cause for a
discharge
(1) For Example When the employer has an established procedure of progressive discipline, such procedures generally must have been followed in order to
establish that the employee had knowledge of the expected behavior or the seriousness of the act. The exception is that very severe conduct, such as criminal
actions, may justify immediate discharge without following a progressive disciplinary program
c Control
fhe conduct must have been within the power and
capacity of the claimant to control or prevent
2
- Just cause may not be established when the reason for discharge is based on such things as mere
*ni8takes, inefficiency, failure of performance as the
result of inability or incapacity, inadvertence in ISOated instances, good faith errors in judgment or in
£*e exercise of discretion, minor but casual or unintentional carelessness or negligence, etc These examples of conduct are not disqualifying because of the
ck of knowledge or control However, continued m^ c i e n c y , repeated carelessness, or lack of care exer~**d by ordinary, reasonable workers in similar cir^ a s t a n c e s , may be disqualifying depending on the
*~f°n and degree of the carelessness, the knowledge

- ? ^ t r o 1 °f

t h e em lo

P y*e.

T*» The term "just cause" as used in Section 5(b)(1)
f-^ not lessen the requirement that there be some
the lQM**16 p a r t o f t J a e emplovee involved. Prior to
« 1 9 8 3 addition of the term ^ust cause" the ComJU
» u m interpreted Section 5(b)(1) to require an in-

R475-5b-104

tentional infliction of harm or intentional disregard
of the employer's interests. The intent of the Legislature m adding the words "just cause" to Section
5(b)(1) was apparently to correct this restrictive interpretation While some fault must be present, it is
sufficient that the acts were intended, the consequences were reasonably foreseeable, and that such
acts have serious effect on the employee's job or the
employer's interests.
R475-5b-103. Burden of Proof.
1. In a discharge, the employer initiates the separation and, as such, is the primary source of information with regard to the reasons for the dismissal. The
employer has the burden of proof which is the responsibility to establish the facts resulting in the discharge The employer is required by the Statute m
Section 35-4-11(g) to keep accurate records and to
provide correct information to the Department for
proper administration of the Act Although the employer has the burden to establish just cause for the
discharge, if sufficient facts are obtained from the
claimant, a decision will be made based on the information available The failure of one party to provide
information does not necessarily result in a ruling
favorable to the other party
2. All interested parties have the right to give rebuttal to information contrary to the interests of that
party.
R475-5b-I04. Quit or Discharge.
The determination of whether a separation is a quit
or a discharge is made by the Department based on
the circumstances which resulted in the separation.
The conclusions on the employer's records, the separation notice or the claimant's report are not controlling on the Department
1 Discharge Before Effective Date of Resignation
a Discharge
When an individual notifies an employer that he
intends to leave as of a definite date in the future and
is discharged prior to that date, the cause for the separation on the day the separation takes place is the
controlling factor in determining whether it was a
quit or discharge Although the separation might
have been motivated by the claimants announced
resignation, the employer was the moving party in
ending the employment prior to the resignation date
Therefore, the immediate reason was more closely related to the emplover s action than to the claimant's
announced intention to quit Unless disqualifying
conduct is involved, the separation is considered to be
for the convenience of the employer If the employer
does not pay regular wages through the period of the
notice but merely pays vacation pav which was not
previously assigned to the period of the notice, the
separation is still the result of a discharge which occurs prior to the date the worker planned to quit The
assignment of vacation pay to the period of time between the notice of intended resignation and the last
date the employee planned work does not change the
character of the separation.
b Quit
If an employee announces a future date of resignation and is relieved of work responsibilities but is
paid regular wages through the date of his announced
resignation, it is not a discharge, but a quit.
2. Leaving in Anticipation of Discharge
When an employee leaves work m anticipation of a
possible discharge or layoff, and if the reason for the
discharge would not be disqualifying, the separation
is generally considered to be a voluntary quit. How-

R475-5b-105

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

ever, an individual who leaves work to avoid virtually certain discharge for disqualifying conduct cannot thereby avoid the disqualifying provisions of Section 35-4-5(b), and the separation is considered a discharge rather than voluntary leaving
3 Employee Knows His Action will Result in Discharge
Absence taken without permission, or other actions
contrary to specific reasonable instructions from tne
employer, are generally considered a voluntary separation rather than discharge if the worker was given
a choice of complying or being separated
R475-5b-105. Disciplinary S u s p e n s i o n o r Involuntary Furlough.
When an emplovee is put on a disciplinary suspension or involuntary furlough, he may meet the definition of' unemployed ' If the claimant files during the
suspension or furlough, the reason for the suspension
or furlough must be adjudicated as a discharge, even
though the claimant is still attached to the employer
and expects to return to work A suspension which
was reasonable and necessan to prevent potential
harm to the employer or to maintain necessars discipline would generally result in a disqualification under this section provided the elements of control and
knowledge are present Failure to return to work at
the end of the definite period of suspension or furlough would be considered a voluntary quit and eligibility would then be determined consistent with Section 35-4-5la), if the claimant had not been previouslv
denied
R475-5b-106. P r o x i m a l C a u s e — R e l a t i o n of Offenses to D i s c h a r g e .
1 Tne cause for discharge is that conduct which
motivates the employer to make the decision to terminate the employee's services If the decision has
truly been made, it is generally demonstrated b\ wa\
of notice to the employee or the initiation of a personnel action Although the employer ma\ learn of other
offenses following the making of the decision to terminate, the reason for tne discharge is limited to that
conduct of which the employer was aware prior to
maKing the decision However if the employer discnarges a person because of some p r e h m m a n evidence of certain conduct but does not obtain all of tne
proof of the conduct until after the separation notice
is given, it coula still be concluded that the discharge
was caused b\ that conduct which the employer was
investigating Eligibility for benefits will tnen be determined b\ considering tne extent of culpabihts,
knowledge and control
2 When the discnarge does not occur immediateh
after the employer becomes aware of an offense, a
presumption arises that there were otner reasons for
the discharge Tnis relationship between the offense
and the discharge must be established both as to
cause and time The presumption that the conduct
was not the cause of the discharge ma\ be overcome
by a showing that the delay was due to such things as
investigation, arbitration, or hearings conducted witn
regard to the employee's conduct W^en a grievance
or arbitration is pending with respect to the discharge, the Department's decision will be based on
the information available to the Department The Department's decision is not binding on the grievance
resolution process or an arbitrator and the decision of
e arbitrator is not binding on the Department
When an employer is faced with the necessit> of a
reduction in his workforce but uses an employee's
p n o r conduct as the c n t e n a for determining who will
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be laid off, the lack of work is the primary motivation
or cause of the discharge, not the conduct.
R475-5b-107. I n C o n n e c t i o n with E m p l o y m e n t
Disqualifying conduct is not limited to offenses
which take place on the employer s premises or during business hours It is onlv necessary that the conduct have such ' connection" to the employee's duties
and to the employer s business that it is a subiect of
legitimate and significant concern to the employer
All employers, both public and private have the right
to expect emplovees to refrain from acts wrhich are
detrimental to the business or would bring dishonor
on the business name or the institution Legitimate
interests of employers include, but are not limited to
goodwill of customers reputation of the business efficienc>, business costs, morale of employees, discipline, honest}, trust and loyalty
R475-5b-108. E x a m p l e s of R e a s o n s for Discharge.
In all the following examples, the basic elements of
lust cause must be considered in determining ehgibil\t\ for benefits Tne following examples do not include all reasons for discharge
1 Violation of Compan> Rules
If an emplovee violates reasonable rules of the employer and the three elements of culpability, knowledge and control are established, benefits must be
denied
a The reasonableness of the employer's rules will
depend on the necessit} for such a rule as it affects
the employer s interests Rules which are contrary to
general public pohc\ or which infringe upon the recognized rights and privileges of individuals may not
be reasonable An employer must have broader prerogatives in regulating conduct when emplovees are
on the job than when they are not An employer must
be able to make rules for emplovee on-the-job conduct
tnat reasonably furtner the legitimate business interests of the employer An employer is not required to
impose onh minimum standards but there may be
some justifiable cause for violations of rules that are
unreasonable or unduly harsh rigorous or exacting
When rules are changed adequate notice and reasonable opportunity to comply must be afforded If the
emplovee believes a rule is unreasonable he has the
responsibihu to discuss his concerns with the emplover and give the employer an opportunit\ to take
corrective action
b Discharges ma\ be regulated bv an employment
contract or collective bargaining agreement J u s t
cause for the discharge is not established if tne emplovee s conduct was consistent with his rights under
such contract or tne discharge was c o n t r a n to the
provisions of such contract
c Habitual offenses may not be disqualifying conduct if it is found that the act was condoned by the
employer or was so prevalent as to be customary
However, when the worker is given notice that the
conduct will no longer be tolerated, further violations
could result in a denial of benefits
d Culpability may be established even if the result
of the violation of the rule does not in and of itself
cause harm to the employer, but the resultant lack of
compliance with rules diminishes the employer's ability to have order and control Culpability is established if termination of the emplovee was required to
maintain necessar\ discipline in the company
e Knowledge of the employer's standards of behavior is usually provided in the form of verbal instructions, w n t t e n rules and/or warnings However, the
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warning is not always necessary for a disqualification
to apply in cases of violations of a serious nature of
universal standards of conduct of which the claimant
ahould have been aware without being warned
2 Attendance Violations
a It is the duty ot the worker to be punctual and
remain at work within the reasonable requirements
of the employer Discharge for unjustified absence or
tardiness is considered disqualifying if the worker
knows that he is violating attendance rules Such violations are generally a serious matter of concern to
emplovers as attendance standards are necessary to
maintain order, control, and productivity Discharge
for an attendance violation beyond the control of the
worker is not disqualifying unless the worker reasonably could have given notice or obtained permission
consistent with the employers rules
b In cases of termination for violations of atten
dance standards the emolovee s recent historv of at
tendance shall be considered to determine if the vio
lation is an isolated incident or demonstrates a pattern of unjustified absences within the control of the
emplovee Flagrant misuse of attendance privileges
may result in a denial of benefits even if the last
incident was beyond the emplovee s control
3 Falsification of Work Record
a The dutv of honestv is inherent in any em
ployee employer relationship A statement made in
an application for a job may be considered as con
nected with the work even though it is made before
the work begins An individual begins his obligations
as an emplovee when he makes an application for
w
ork One of those obligations is to give the employer
truthful answers to all material questions Any falsi
ncation of information which may operate to expose
the employer to possible loss litigation or damage
would be considered material and therefore mav e$
tabhsh culpability If the claimant made a false statement while applying for work in order to be hired
benefits ma> be denied even if the claimant would
have otherwise remained unemployed and eligible for
the receipt of unemployment benefits depending upon
the degree of knowledge culpability and control
4 Insubordination
Authority is required in the work place to maintain
°raer and efficiency An employer has the right to
expect that lines of authority will be maintained that
reasonable orders given in a ci\il manner will be
obeved that supervisors will be respected and that
their authority will not be undermined In determinmg when insubordination (resistance to authority)
becomes disqualifying conduct the fact that there
w
as a disregard of the emplovers interests is the
major importance Mere protests or dissatisfaction
^thout an overt act is not in disregard of the employer s interests However provocative remarks to a
8upenor or vulgar or profane language in response to
a
civil request may be insubordination if it is conducive to disruption of routine negation of authority
aad impairment of efficiencv Mere incompatibility or
emphatic insistence or discussion by an employee
who was acting m good faith is not disqualifying conduct
5 Loss of License
When an employee loses a license which he knows
IB required for the performance of the job, and the
individual had control over the circumstances which
faulted m the loss of the license, such conduct is
disqualifying For example, if the claimant worked as
a driver, and lost his license because of a conviction
lor driving under the influence iDUI), culpability is
established if he fails to obtain a permit to drive at
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work or the conviction would expose the emplover to
additional liabilities The emplover cannot authorize
an emplovee to drive in violation of the law Also,
additional insurance costs or other liabilities are a
legitimate concern of the employer Knowledge is established because it is a matter of common knowledge
in the State of Utah that driving under the influence
of alcohol is a violation of the law and is punishable
by loss of the individual's driving privileges Jucucial
notice can be taken of this fact because a question
relative to this matter is on every drivers license
test He had control in that he made a conscious decision to risk loss of the license when he failed to make
arrangements for transportation pnor to becoming
under the influence of intoxicants
R475-5b-109. Effective Date of Disqualification.
The Act provides that any disqualification under
this section will include the week in which the
claimant was discharged
' However to avoid confusion the denial of benefits will begin with the Sunday of the week for which claimant has filed for benefits
R475-5b-201 Discharge for Crime — General
Definition
1 A crime is a punishable act in violation of law,
an offense against the State or the United States
Crime and Misdemeanor are synonymous terms
though in common usage crime is used to denote offenses of a more serious nature However for example an insignificant although illegal act or the taking or destruction of something which is of little or no
value or believed to have been abandoned mav not be
sufficient to establish that a crime was committed as
defined for the application of this section of the Act
even if the claimant was found guilty of a violation of
the law
2 The duties of honestv and responsible behavior
are implied in any employment relationship A
worker is obligated to deal with his employer responsibly in truthfulness and good faith The penalties
imposed bv this Section (a 52 week disqualification
and subsequent denial until six times the weekh
benefit amount has been earned in bona fide covered
employment) are mandatory and cannot be reduced
3 The factors which are essential for a diuaualifi
cation under this provision of the law are that the
mdiNidual was discharged for a crime that was
a In connection with work
b Dishonest or a felony or class A misdemeanor
and
c Admitted or established by a conviction in a
court of law
4 All discharges which are not disqualifying under Section 35-4 5(b)(2) must be adjudicated under
Section 35-4-5(b)(l)
R475-ob-202. In Connection with Work.
The connection to the work is not limited to offenses which take place on the emplover s premises or
during business hours The employer does not have to
be the victim of the crime but the crime must
adversely affect the emplover s rightful interest It is
necessary that the conduct have a "connection'* to the
employee s duties and to the employer s business that
it is a subject of legitimate and significant concern
All employers, both public and private have the nght
to expect emplovees to rerrain from acts which are
detrimental to the business or would bring dishonor
on the business name of the institution Legitimate
interests of emplovers include, but are not limited to
goodwill of customers, reputation of the business, effi-

R475-5b«203

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

ciency, business costs, morale of employees, discipline, honesty, trust and loyalty
R475-5b-203. Dishonesty or Other Disqualifying
Crimes.
1 Dishonesty in this context generally means
theft Theft is the taking of property without tne
owner's consent Theft also includes swindling and
embezzlement and obtaining possession of property
by lawful means and thereafter appropriating it to
the taker's own use Theft may be any of the following acts done with intent to deprive the owner of his
property (a) obtaining or exerting unauthorized control over property, (b) obtaining control over property
by deception, (c) obtaining control by threat, (d> obtaining control knowing the property had been stolen,
and, (e) obtaining services from another by deception,
threat, coercion, stealth, mechanical tampering or by
use of a false token or device
2 Other disqualifying crimes are felonies and
Class A misdemeanors which are related to emplo\ ment These may include, but are not limited to assault, arson, or destruction of property For a crime
not involving dishonesty, the claimant must be convicted of or admit to committing a felon> or a Class A
misdemeanor Class A is the most serious class of
misdemeanor Felonies are more serious than misdemeanors The category of felony or misdemeanor is
identified by the Court s verdict and cannot be determined from the penalty imposed
3 Felonies and the most serious class of misdemeanor assessed by other state and federal courts
may have different labels, but Section 35-4-5(b)(2)
disqualifications can still be assessed on Utah claimants based upon equivalent convictions
4 Criminal acts other than crimes of dishonesty
which result in conviction on Class B or C misdemeanors can only be used to determine benefit eligibility under Section 35-4-5(b)(l)
R475-5b-204. Admission or Conviction in a
Court.
1 An admission is a voluntary' acknowledgement
made b\ a claimant that he has committed acts which
are in violation of the law In this context, tne admission may be a verbal or written statement b\ the
claimant that he committed the act The admission
does not necessarily have to be made to a Department
representative However, there must be sufficient information to establish that the admission was made
and that it was not a false statement given under
duress or made to obtain some concession
a If the claimant makes a valid admission to a
criminal act involving dishonest\ resulting in a discharge for which he was not prosecutea a penalty
under Section 35-4-5(b)(2) can still be assessed
b If an admission is made to any other disqualifying crime not involving dishonesty, resulting m a
discharge for which he was not prosecuted the Department must determine the probable penalty under
the Utah criminal code to decide whether a disqualification will be assessed under Section 35-4-5(bXl) or
5(b)(2)
2 A conviction is when a claimant has been found
guilty by a court of committing an act which ic in
violation of the law When the claimant pleads "no
contest" or agrees to a diversionary program as provided by the court, this is treated, for the purposes of
this section of the Act, the same as a conviction
R475-5b-205. Benefits Held in Abeyance.
1. For a crime involving theft or a felony or Class
A misdemeanor, the law requires a withholding of a
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determination of eligibility if the claimant has not
made an admission but is held in legal custody or is
free on bail Benefits cannot be paid unless a determination of eligibility is made Failure to pav benefits
even though the burden of proof for a denial under
Section 5(b)(2) has not been met is justified because
the court in holding the claimant in legal custody or
establishing bail has made a preliminary ruling that
the state has established that a crime has been committed and there is reason to believe the individual
committed that crime The filing of charges is not the
same as being held in custody or being free on bail
2 However, if there is a preponderance of evidence
that the act was committed, a denial of benefits
should be made under Section 35-4-5(b)(l), if charges
have not been filed by the employer within four
weeks In such a case, the decision under Section
35-4-5(b)(l) will advise the claimant that a decision
under Section 35-4-5(b)(2* is still pending and the
5^b)(l) disqualification shall be changed to a 5(b)(2)
disqualification if the claimant is found guilty by the
court If the claimant has purged a 5(b)(1) disqualification but a Section 5(b)(2) disqualification is possible
pending a ruling by the court, benefits must be held
in abevance until the court reacnes the verdict The
claimant has the responsibility to provide the Department with the courts verdict in order to establish
eligibility
3 If a determination of eligibility is held in abevance the claimant must be notified in a written decision that benefits are being withheld in accordance
with Section 35-4-5(b)(2) pending a determination by
the court Tne claimant has the right to appeal the
holding of his benefits in abeyance
R475-5b-206. Disqualification Period.
The 52-week disqualification period for Section
5(b)(2) will begin effective with the week of discharge
even if thi^ is before the effective date of the claim In
addition, the disqualification continues until the
claimant has returned to work in bona fide covered
employment and earned six times his weekh benefit
amount after the week in which he was discharged
Tne claimant must provide proof of this employment
and earnings and be otherwise eligible for benefits A
disqualification which begins in one benefit year will
continue into a new benefit year until the 52-week
disqualification has ended and the claimant has sufficient subsequent earnings
1W0
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R475-5c. Failure to Apply for or Accept Suitable Work.
R475-5c-l General Definition
R475-5c-2 Elements Necessary for an Issue
R475-5c-3 Provisions for Allowance of Benefits After
an Issue is Found to Exist
R475-5c-4 Failure to Accept a Referral
R475-5c-5 Proper Application
R475-5c-6 Failure to Accept an Offer of Work.
R475-5c-7 Good Cause
R475-5c-8 Equit) and Good Conscience.
R475-5c-9 Suitability of Work
R475-5c-10 Examples
R475-5c-ll. New Work.
R475-5c-12 Burden of Proof
R475-5c-13. Period of Ineligibility.
R475-5c-14 Notification
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1. Due to the perishable nature of many of the commodities, and in order to prevent spoilage and to meet delivery and
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CAUSES FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL
The following acts will not be tolerated and will be considered sufficient cause tor immediate discharge:
1 Drinking intoxicants, or the use or possession of any illegal stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic substance, on'
Company premises at any time, whether on or off shift, or reporting to work under the effect of intoxicants, or any1;
illegal stimulant, or hallucinogenic substance.
2 Excessive tardiness, or absence without proper reason or notice to management
3. Proven immoral or illegal behavior on Company premises.
4 Any fraudulent act or statement directly related to Company business^
5 Excessive wage attachments or harrassment of the Company byyouV unpaid creditors.
6 Unauthorized possession of or damage to Company funds, property, or merchandise!
7. Quarreling or fighting with other employees.
& r Mishandling of Company funds or property. Any employee willfully damagtng Company property, or breaking and/or
removing from the Company"premises, any merchandise for the purpose of eating or pilferage, will be subject to
immediate termination. All merchandise leaving the warehouse or plant must be accompanied by an invoice.
9 Gambling on Company property,
10 insubordination, falsifying records, disclosing confidential information, or any other a d constituting willful disregard
of the Company* s best interest/

XI.

BONDING* AU employees must be bonded The premium involved shall be paid by the Company. In the event the Company's regular bonding company refuses to give bond to any employee tor any reason, then and in that event, the
employee will be subject to immediate termination.

XU.

CHAUFFEUR'S LICENSES' AU driver-warehousemen will be required to have a valid Chauffeur's License in the states
where they are required and for the state where the plant or distribution center is located, within fifteen (15) days after
they are employeed. After fifteen (15) days of employment, all driver-warehousemen must at all times have a valicT
Chauffeur's license. The license must be earned with them at ail times. No exceptions will be made.

XIII

PASSENGERS No dnver-warehouseman will allow anyone, other than employees of the employer who are on duty,
to ride on his truck. This will not prohibit the dnver-warehouseman from picking up other drivers, helpers, or others in
wrecked or broken down motor equipment and transportmo them to the first available point of communication, repair,'
lodging, or available medical attention.

XIV.

COMPANY (MAGE Aff actions by employees reflect upon the image o(Att>ertson% Inc., and In your deatings with the
public, you should at ail times conduct yourself in a manner that is beyond reproach This includes being cautious of,
your actions in public, your dress and personal appearance, driving habits, language, etc.

\ hereby certify that I have read and understand the above Distribution and Manufacturing policies; and that in connection with
the application for employment with, continued employment by, or advancement with Albertson's, Inc*, I have been advised
through receipt of this form that:
1* An investigative consumer report as to my character, general reputation, personal characteristics, and mode of
living may be made and,
2. I have the nght to make a written request within a reasonable time for a complete and accurate disclosure of the,
nature and scope of the investigation requested.
I also acknowledge that any report or other information required by Federal or State law nowvr hereafter in affect shall be
deemed received by me if addressed to me at my last known addressT

Signature _ L J
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Witness by Supervisor

^ < V / ? iirnrt

Distribution Center or Plants

Original - Personnel Fife

1st Copy - Employee

2nd Copy '- n
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January 31, 1990

TO:

Gayle Fullerton

FROM:

Kirk Hansen

SUBJECT:

SUSPENSION

v.
(WILLFUL DISTRUCTION OF COMPANY PROPERTY)

On Sunday January 28, 1990 you willfully kicked in the door to the warm-up
room. Due to this type of behavior on your party you are placed on a
Disciplinary Suspension for the period of two weeks without pay beginning
January 31, 1990 thru February 14, 1990. You will report back to work at
your regularly scheduled start time February 15, 1990. Any further
incidents of this nature will result in your termination.
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will be represented by Diane Henderson. There may be several witnesses
who will identity themselves at the time that they're sworn.
The Department of Employment Security's decision dated April 29th, 1992
denied the payment of unenployment benefits to the claimant effective
April 5th, 1992, and awarded the errployer relief of charges on the
grounds the claimant was discharged for disqualifying just cause. His
appeal filed May 4th, 1992 was tiirely.
Since there are no procedural questions, we'll go directly to testimony;
and I assume that you wish to have this gentleman called as your first
witness, Ms. Henderson, is that correct?
HENDERSON

Yes.

JUDGE

Would you raise your right hand to be sworn?
OATH AEMINISTERED.

Employer witness answered in the affirmative.

Thank you, sir. If you'd state your name and position with the company,
please?
KIM)

Darrel Kidd; Warehouse Operations Manager, at Albertsons Distribution in
North Salt lake.

JUDGE

And hew long have you been in that capacity?

KTDD

One and a-half (1 1/2) years.

JUDGE

And with ycur job or in your job capacity, were you the direct
supervisor of Mr. Fullerton?

KTDD

Not directly.

JUDGE

Did you dismiss him?

KIDD

Yes, I did.

JUDGE

Okay.
And do you have firsthand knowledge with respect to the
occurrences or are you testifying from what others have told you and
company records?

KIDD

From what others have told me and company records.

JUDGE

We shew that he was employed with Albertsons, then, from April 5th of
1981 to April 3rd of '92, is that correct?

KEDD

Thatfs correct.
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JUEGE

And his job title at separation?

KEDD

Forklift operator.

JUDGE

And his rate of pay, if you know it?

KEDD

Uh, eleven ten (11.10)?

CLAIMANT

Yeah.

JUDGE

And was this a full or part-time position?

KEDD

Full time.

JUDGE

And what caused the job to end, was this a quit or a discharge?

KEDD

Discharge.

JUDGE

And what were the reasons that you gave him that you were dismissing
him?

KEDD

Willful destruction of ccanpany property.

JUDGE

And what specifically does that mean?

KEEO

Vfe believe that he purposely caused damage to one of the forklifts, it
was not by accident.

JUDGE

And you don't have firsthand knowledge of this, is that correct?

KIDD

I did not witness the incident, no.

JUDGE

Okay. Hew did you make your decision to dismiss him?

KIDD

Based on past records of similar nature and testimonies given to me by
the individual who witnessed the incident.

JUDGE

By "past record of similar nature", what do you mean by that?

YICD

On January 31st of 1990, Gayle was suspended for willful destruction of
company property* He kicked a—an office door and broke it.

JUDGE

Were you the person that interviewed him at that time?

KIDD

Yes, I was.

JUDGE

And did you see what had occurred?

KEIDD

I did not witness it, personally.
4

JUDGE

Okay. What was the discussion between the two of ycu?

KIDD

I told him that I had heard fran others on his crew that he had kicked
in the door; and he told me that he had, that he was just messing
around. He didn't mean to break it.

JUDGE

Okay. Any other occurrence?

KTDD

In April of 1989, —

JUDGE

That's a way long time ago; did that have anything to do with your
decision?

KIDD

It was part of the eanoployee's record, which was not directly related to
this incident; however, it was just part of his past history.

JUDGE

Okay. Tell me about that?

KIDD

He was suspended for unsafe operation of equipment, at which time he'd
been employed for approximately eight (8) years.
The incident, he
tipped over the forklift in which he was operating, for going around a
corner too fast.

JUDGE

And did you interview him at that time?

KIDD

Yes, I did.

JUDGE

And tell me the conversation.

KIDD

It was tcwards the end of the shift. He told me that he was in a hurry.
His mast (?) was still up in the air and he had just made (inaudible
portion of tape. Did not record properly.) — as long as he'd been
operating that type of equipment, yeah. He should have been using more
safe methods to operate the equipment, and I didn't feel that he should
have tipped it over.

JUDGE

Okay. Anything else that you wish to add or state?

KIDD

No.

JUDGE

Thank you. Any questions you have of him?

HENDERSON

Yes. Mr. Kidd, what is Albertsons1 policy, employee policy on willful
destruction of company property?

KIDD

On the company policy that the employee signs when they hire on, section
10, number 8. Section 10 is "CAUSES FOR IMMEDIATE DISMISSAL". And
number 8 states:

5

Mishandling of Company funds or property.
Any ertployee
willfully damaging Company property, or breaking and/or
removing from the Company premises . . .
HENDERSON

And is that cause for immediate dismissal?

KIDD

Yes, it is.

HENDERSON

Okay. Your Honor, the employer has submitted a packet of documents.

JUDGE

It's marked as Exhibit 4.

HENDERSON

Okay.

JUDGE

Did you get a copy of these documents?

CLAIMANT

Yes, I did.

JUDGE

Okay.

HENDERSON

And we'd also like to submit the warning that Mr. Kidd has testified,
from January 31st, and from April 18th.

JUDGE

Ihe one April, I prefer to go in chronological order; so the one dated
April 19th of '89 has been marked as Exhibit 5. Ihe one that's dated
January 31st of '90 is marked as Exhibit 6.
And I'll need more
information on that one. I'm not entering them into the record right
new. I'm just identifying them.

HENDERSON

Okay. Mr. Kidd, did you—do you have the dollar amount of damage that
was caused by the final incident where you made the decision to
discharge?

KIDD

I believe it was $168 and something cents. Approximately $169.

HENDERSON

Okay.

JUDGE

Ihank you. Any questions you have, sir?

SPENCER

Yes. Darrel, in regards to the 1990 incident and the 1992 incident, you
didn't personally witness either of those incidences, but relied totally
upon the testimony of others, is that correct?

KIDD

Ihe testimony of others and his previous record, yes.

SPENCER

Okay.
Is there a union contract in effect between Albertsons and
Teamsters Local 222 that covers the warehouse employees?

I have no further questions of Mr. Kidd.

6

FT u s

It was early morning, I was working graveyard shift at the time. He
walked in to ask for a battery change, and I told him I'd be ri#it
there. I got up and wiped my hands to walk out, by that time he'd
already pushed the other battery back in. He had trouble putting the
retaining plate in and started beating on the machine. I asked him to
stop; he wouldn't stop. I told him, I said, "ycu break that cover, I'm
gonna have to turn you in". His response then was, "I don't give a
shit, go ahead and turn me in. It'll be the last thing you ever do".

JUDGE

And what happened?

FT I T S

He beat on it a couple more times then—then left.

JUDGE

Did it break?

FTTTS

Yes,

JUDGE

Okay. Then what did you do?

FT I T S

As soon as my supervisor came in, I reported the incident.

JUDGE

Okay, thank you. Ms. Henderson.

HENDERSON

Yes. You testified that Mr. Fullerton came and asked you to help him
replace the battery. Hew long was it from the time he asked you to help
him replace the battery until the time you witnessed him banging the
battery on the plate?

KT.TTS

Certainly less than a minute.

HENDERSON

Less than a minute?

ELLIS

Uh-hram.

HENDERSON

And is it your job duty to help assist with —

ELLIS

To assist 'em, right.

HENDERSON

Okay. Would it be normal—would it be protocol for the claimant to try
and change the battery by himself?

KTJiTS

It happens; yes, mafam.

HENDERSON

Okay. Did ycu see where the claimant was standing, the claimant being
Mr. Fullerton, where he was standing at the time?

ELLIS

He was standing on the rack.

HENDERSON

Can you describe what the rack is?

it

did.
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ELLIS

The battery rack is a platform made of steel with rollers through the
center of it. Well, alcng each side of the frame, in between the frame
that the battery rolls in and out on.

HENDERSON

Did you see the claimant standing on the rollers at all?

FT ITS

Yes, I did.

HENDERSON

On the rollers, themselves?

ELLIS

Well, on the platform, next to the—The rollers is in between the frame,
and the frame's on the outside.

HENDERSON

Okay.

ELLIS

Between 1500 and 1800, I'm not really positive on that, pounds.

HENDERSON

Okay. Would it be normal procedure for someone to stand on rollers to
change this battery?

ELLIS

No, ma'am.

HENDERSON

And why would that—why wouldn't that be?

ELLIS

They roll extremely freely.
saxething of that weight.

HENDERSON

Okay.

ELLIS

Of the cover, yes, fiberglass cover.

HENDERSON

Okay.

JUDGE

Has he seen this?

HENDERSON

No.

JUDGE

I think he needs to see it first.

HENDERSON

We don't intend to submit this, this is the only copy.
visual aid for the—for the look of the frame.

How much does a battery weigh, one of these batteries?

They would need to be able to push

Is this a picture of the frame that was broken?

Your Honor, we didn't submit this; but just for your visual aid.

(Pause) Continue.
It's just for a

Okay.
At any time when you asked the claimant to stop hitting the
frame, did he tell you he had slipped or did he provide any excuse for
what he was doing?
ELLIS

No.

11
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HENDERSON

Okay. No further questions.

JUDGE

Thank you. Any questions you have, Mr. Spencer?

SPENCER

Yes.
I'd like to get into a little more detail on hew this—this
battery is switched. You say it weighs between 1500 and 1800 pounds,
Earl?

ELLIS

Yes.

SPENCER

Hew do they get it out of the forklift onto the floor or onto the
platform, isn't there a ridge or a lift of seme sort?

FT u s

There's no ridge or no lift; the reach truck pulls alongside of the
frame of the battery rack.
The frame of the—I mean, the battery
cotpartment of the reach truck's got rollers in it. The same as the
frame for the battery holder. They push the battery out frcro one set of
rollers in the reach truck to the set of rollers on the—the battery
exxrpartment.

JUDGE

Who's—who's "(t)hey"?

ELLIS

Either the driver or myself.

JUDGE

Oh, okay. Thank you.

ELLIS

I assist 'em or they assist me. It takes two to do it because you've
got to move the battery rack back and forth, which is on rollers also.

SPENCER

And this is—Hew long does this procedure normally take?

ELLtS

Well, it don't take very long at all; did it?

SPENCER

You stated it—it was less than a minute and he had already switched the
battery, and then he started beating on the (unintelligible).

ELLIS

He'd already pushed it in, yes.

SPENCER

He had taken the old battery out —

ELLIS

Before he came into the Maintenance Shop to get me, he'd already pushed
the old battery out.

SPENCER

Okay. Approximately hew many times did you see him physically barg on
this battery caper (sic)—cover?

ELLIS

I didn't count it, but it was several times.
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SPENCER

You stated that it was—that Mr. Fullerton had broken the—the cover.
Wasn't that cover broken prior to the incident?

ELLIS

No, sir.

SPENCER

Then what was the problem with sliding the cover or the —

ELLIS

Retaining plate in?

SPENCER

—

TTITS

The battery had to be held over slightly because it, like I say, the
rollers roll extremely freely and if the frame hit the—the floor's not
even, which it's not, the battery will roll a little bit. I held it
over for him to put the cover in, I mean to put the retaining plate in,
by that time he'd already broke the cover on it.

SPENCER

Why would he beat on the cover of the forklift when it had nothing to do
with moving the battery one direction or another, in your opinion?

ELLIS

He had a rough day.

SPENCER

Are you familiar with Albertsons' progressive discipline policy; I guess
what I'm trying to ask here is, did you expect Mr. Fullerton to be
terminated from this incident?

ELLIS

No, I didn't.

SPENCER

What would have been the normal procedure in your estimation?

ELLIS

I would have suspected he would have got suspended. I didn't think he
would get fired; but, then again, I did not knew his past history
either.

SPENCER

Okay. Thank you, Mr. Ellis; that's all I've got.

JUDGE

Thank you. Anything else you have?

HENDERSON

Yes. Based on the last question, did ycu play any part in the decision
to terminate?

ELLIS

Definitely not.

HENDERSON

Are you a supervisor, at all, of Mr. Fullerton?

ELLIS

No.

HENDERSON

Okay. No further questions.

It was a brand new cover.

the retaining plate in?
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J \.J UGE

Let me ask you, si: ,. ..:,•: ^ ^;^:
the reta i n —

ELLIS

r

ne piat^. or the cover, or

- riant, bene is the fiberglass cover that he broke.. Ihey don f t have
i* picture of the place. The picture of the plate is a piece of metal
3/16*3 of an incn thick, 4" tall, and about 12" long1.

JUDGE
ELLIS

It's ;;u:3t a very lightweight piece of material.

JUDGE

-o any of these pictures shew 'where 'the battery is actually
located on the equipment?

FT ITS

Wei], vot /ery clear] y

It's directly underneath this.

irwii in this

portion, down here.
JI JDGE

r

Ok.-n

-.: , what, j"i 1st supports the battery?

ELLIS
Yes.. The plate goes, right in —
JUDGE
Ct! cay. so the battery fits here and the plate just holds it in place.
ELLIS
Rj gilt, r i <«./ ; -

n •

JUDGE
Okay. Any problems the two of you have ever had?
ELLIS
No.
JUDGE

j^i}

^ \ < you,

Anyone t.se you neec -o ca3 1 ?

HENDERSON
Yd.

^- , >>cotx Bradshaw*

JUDGE

1,1

-^ • -exami ne, d i dn't I?

«

SPENCER
Yes.
JUDGE
Okay, sorry.

Okay

Next one?

HENDERSCi I
JUDGE

AT id w .

i A*6 ;ieed Mr. Bradshaw?

HENDERSON

He was the claimant's direct supervisor and h e actuallv rerformed the
discharge.

JUDGE

I dot !ft : - -

HENDERSO: 1

And I nterviewed him as to "'what his story was as. to what had happened,,
14
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JUDGE

Oh, c >kay

Be :i i c:ji it I :x »< ::) ::: (OFF RECORD)

We 1 re back;, on record. No testimony was taken or given during the tine
that we were off record, I si up] y went and got Mr'. Bradshaw. Would you
agree, Mr. Spencer?
SPENCER
JUDGE
HENDERSON
JUDGE

Yes.
Thank ) cii

Would you agree, Ms, Henderson?

Yes.
Thank you.

You've been call ed, to testify, sir.

Would, you raise your

right hand,,?
OATH AEMD^LSTERED.

v

~ Bradshaw answered in, the affirmative.

Ttiar> you, ;*-. " * you'd state your name and position?
ERADSI JAW

*> <v

.*.-!::;•:..,

: *v. *i Superintendei it of Albertsons.

JUDGE

• Okay «rc <^> su ;:. ^ore the direct supervisor of Mr. Fullerton?

BRADSHAW

Yes.

JUDGE

Ana

, *:, .wo you been h...- 2 irect supervi sor?

BRADSHAW

A couple years, - v

JUDGE

Okay.

..

*•

m u111 hi i aspect In what uxunred with the

forkliiu".
W<ADSHAW
JUDGE

Yes.
Okay,

And tell me when the .incident occurred and when, you, talked to

him?
It f s written on the letters.

BRADSHAW

The date, 1 don't have exactly.

JUDGE
BRADSHAW

Okay.
I called him in after LaVell James had approached me and told me what
Earl had told him. Ard that's when I called Mr. Fullerton in, and we
talked abcxit it; and it started, out 'where, he denied anything, as far as
involvement with the battery, or the lid, or whatever. And we proceeded
to tell him about 'what was said, ard what we've heard, and what Earl and
LaVell had told me. 'Later' he said it was an accident, and 'that it w a s —
15

'had grease on it and it slipped exit of his fingers.
'basically, 1 don't know (pause)
JUDGE

A

.

Ard tna;

was,

Anything else you said to him?

BRADSHAW
W;;>V v \.

JUDGE
HENDERSON"

~'J ahead, Ms. Henderson?

IOU tjestified the conversation that you, had, at any time did
Mr. Fulierton make the excuse that he was standing on sane rollers and
had siioped?

BRADSHAW

None.

HENDERSQI: J"
BRADSHAW

r^r, .
...- y;\, -..:.; _j^t jt u r s t ne Jcrat/; ^nyt:.i:>3 v. JU - h thf
battery, is t^at all he said or car. you expand on what he said?
(Lrujrw^iigiLie, , I j o ; / : ; ; ^; ne ju^t <*cuxi .^.i. he cudn'L Knew nothing
about it. at f i r s t ; and then as we got into talking ard explaining that—
that Earl seen him do t h i s and LaVeil told me t h i s , and, t h a t ' s when he
said :*~ ^r ^ --'-~-idor.*'.

HENDERSOt I

0- .•

BRADSHAW

-.-

_G \ x: rake the decision to discharge the claimant? •

No.

HENDERSOi I

" Jl i\

BRADSHAW'

Through Darrel, and I'm sure he had a conference with Boise.

HENDERSON

if " \

ud™and wh » *a«_> tliat decision nude by, in peart?

N " f i1r1 V ' quwt l < ns.

JUDGE

Thank you. Any questions you have, sir?

SPENCER

Scott, during your interview with Mi . u^lerton, I guess during your
investigative portion, of 'this incident, did Gayle at any time state that
the battery cover was already broken?

BRADSHAW

(Pause) Uh, no.

SPENCER

And yes- already te-srified that he sa:c he—ne didn't sav an^-thiric about
starding on the rollers and sliding, -r sl:ppinq, i-r—cr anythina of
that "S-7,rne?

BRADSHAW

N o , : r r . : >..

SPENCER

T h a t ' s CLL!

: *o.

• Thank you.

AnythI ng further, Ms. Henderson? .

HENDERSON

No.

JUDGE

Okfl'j.

HENDERSON

No.

JUDGE

Okay,
.^^ • • ,1 past alio* J\K> :/C regain here, then
ahead and swear -/c^ ,-*, ^ X U G you raj <> ycx;- right hand"

i1 II i I ili1

OATH A04INISTERED.
Ihank you, sir.
for the record?
CLAIMMfT

.in/'Mit; t - l s c 1 LUII your

Claimant answered

side?

->JLT.

±-±.± go

u«- nf; . r.im; .va.

If you'd state, your nante and current mailing address

Name is Gayle, M. Fullerton.
Jordan, Utah,,

Live at 7669 .South Sunrise. Place in West

JUDGE

' And your zip code is 84084?

OiOMANr

Yes.

JUDGE

Okay.
^jur^ - uw uie ±O^L uxcitje u i a c you worked p r i o n
b e n e f i t s was A i b e r t s o n s , i s t h a t c o r r e c t ?

i/IAIMAMl'

, • • •:

JUDGE

Okay.

CLAIMANT

No, not yet.

i/-LXJL

Okay. You've heard the enplqyer state, your dates of employment, type of
work you were' doing, hours and wage; is that 'Correct, to the best., of your
knowledge?

OIATMANT

Ws.

JUDGE

And "would,, you, agree that thi s is a discharge rather' than, a voluntary

t o f i 1 1 ng

for

And are. you, back to work, at, 'this point?

quit?
CIAIMANT
JUDGE
Q^JJ^I^JI

Yes.
Oka\. And what were 'the reasons that you were told that you wcn;i loincj
dismissed?
p o r ^ ^ - i r t ^ ^ ^ Q £ oonparry property
W:i ] Ifii] ] y destructi i >g.
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JUDGE

Okay, I assume that that has tx> do with the damaged forklifi
truck, is that correct?

CLAIMANT

Yes.

JUDGE

All ri'iht , Wfru

cmmOT

(No audible response)

.I1JDGE

Calendar help you at all?

ui"i+ ri did t h i s n m i r i dn ynu n^mnter

reach

t]ip> datP 9

(I ong pause)
JUDGE

If you don f t, that f s ok<i.

T

CAIMANT

It's— ,:i t f s the, date that was stated on the report, I believe.

' ./*

About Apri ] 2nd :
CLAIMANT

Yeah.

JUDGE

Oka;}

CLAIMANT

I went in "to get a, tottery change ard it was, I believe, afternoon not
morning. And,, I went in to ask Earl to come and help me. And I went out
and I waited. It 'wasn't one minute; it was at least five (5) minutes.
And I have a quota to keep; so I just 'book it upon nr/self to change 'the
battery. I kicked the battery out. I — I switched batteries, and I
pushed the fresh battery back in; and the batteries sit on rollers. And
there f s no way you can push ! em in wi thout standing on, those rollers,
There's just no other way to do it. And usually you use the rollers as
a brace t o — t o get enough force behind the battery, because they are so
big and heavy, to push It in. And a ':ot of tines, you know, you—you
need help to do that. H.r, l*ve had a lot of experience at it; so I got
the battery back in and b\ this time Earl had coie out. And, to ire, he
seeired, like he was in a bad mood because. I believe they had just got a
butt chewing frcro—because they weren't keeping the machines in good
operating order. 'Cause we were always having lifts break dewn and, it
was holding us up on our production. So he, to ire, seemed to be in a
bad way.

JUDGE

What made y%,, th:nk

niAIMAMI

Beeaus* \p

JUDGE

AnytMng he did or said t h a t nade v K. - link t J e t ?

CLAIMANT

Uh, I c a n ' t ren^rixr exactly
impression : \~
-\ *
*

Wt lat hap: ened?

! iHort lA.JJ".pi.CHi.

^ast l r..td t h a t impression. That wa s the •
c->xactly remember what was. said
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JUDGE
QAIMANr

It's not clear. Rut I tried to put the plate on, and T—I couldn't C.K "
it in there. Arid I was tired, a little bit tired frcir. pushing it in;
I stood up, t:c Kind of catch my brtvith, I had the p]/»r- in my han.
r -^Mri. it.1--. :.t tc nolo which is a pretty heavy piece of ::* * /.
1500-pound battery inside of there; so it's—it's a pretty good-sized
piece of metal. And when I stood up, I was on this—on the north side
of the lift and. Earl was on the south side. And he was knelt down, I
don't knew if he was trying to hold the battery in or what; but he
couldn't see my feet. He was on the other side of the lift. When I
stood up, I slipped an the roller, that are. somewhat oily anyway. And
as I—1 grabbed for my balance, I—1 brought the plate down onto the
lift. It chipped it a .1 i ttl e ti nyfait and i t, i n no way, broke the—the
plastic.
When tfidt. happened, the plastic *a^ p^cviou^Iy orx^keri n ^ . when you put
a pallet ;»way, you back out, sometimes the lift will go underneath the
racks and that's hew the—the cover was broken. It was already broken
in the first place. And, you know, it it. cones down to it, 1—there—I
YJX** There's some workers that I work with that could testify to that.
And tney saw what happened after I had dropped—fallen or. it with the
plate and it—it did not break it. And—and, basically tnat!s what
happened. Then 1—1 put the plate in, and just left.

JUDGE
CLAIMANT

0r„, yes, he saic. rif you do that agai*
I have no, you rj>c**, problem with r>.:
I just thought H- W ^ i>^f +-^"ivirf-:
seriou..-.

JUD3E

What do
again?

CI AIMANT

He—-he assumed ^ L^I. . • *.\ + . *xiu.i destruction. He didn-u KTJCW 'that I
slipped. He couldn't h a w kr>cvn !cause he couldn't see my feet. But.,
apparently, he assumed that I willfully did it; but I didr.'t know that.
I just thought he was just talking, 'cause we 'talk a lot at work. I
didn't take him serious; and—and I just said, "go ahead if you do"—I
didn't say, I don't give a, shit,, I didn't say that. I said, "go ahead.
If you do, it'll be the last thing you ever do", just talking. I wasn't
serious. I didn't knew he was serious. Because I joke around with my
fellcw wort-cars that way.
And I—I wasn't—I didn't intentionally
And apparently he—he
threaten him in a—in a way—in that way.
understood it that .way, and that's what became of th<=> situation. He did
turn me in.

you

Xl\\\\\

Ii<

Wia

<y >niq
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: ' - gonna turn you,,, in"; but I —
I've got along with, him, well.
T didn't knew fp was reall y

i "" I 11111 yi nJ

111 I > 11 ,

i

'i HI i 1 hi I W t l d t

HENDERSON

Yes.

JUDGE

We've discussed Exhibits 5 and 6.
Mr. E l l i s , i s t:r^t correct?

HENDERSON

Yes.

I assume Exhibit 7 was written by

Wliat's been marked as Exhibit 8A and B is the Claimant Statement of Jcb
Discharge? and I assume that you. prepared and. submitted, that document,
am I correct, Mr', Fullerton?
Yes.
JUDGE

What's been marked as Exhibit 9A and P is a Statement Regarding Claims
for Benefits dated April 27th; and apparently that was also a telephone
conversation between you and an adjudicator, is that correct?
(Pause)
You need to answer audibly.

CLAIMANT

Yes,,,

JUDGE

Okay.
What's been marked as Exhibit IQA is a Decision of Eligibility
for Unemployment Benefits, that was the denial letter that you
received.
And 10B is 'the employer Notice, of Claimant Eligibility and
Employer Charges that was sent out to the Gibbens Company, What's been
marked as Exhibi t 1 3 i s the appeal.
Any reason that these documents should not. be made part
from your perspective, Ms. Henderson?

Se- record

HENDERSON

No.

JUDGE

Okay

SI'DICER

I oojeL-w, ioui nuuur, uo 'Exhibits D ana t>. ^ relieve iDeings- new they're
over a vear old, thev have no relevancy in this natter.

JUDGE .

Okay.
I will allcw them into the re-cord.
I s 11 also note your
objection, and they will not be given very much weight. This gentleman
had already 'testified, that although :'. had some play in nis decision
making, the main reason he was dismissed for—was what: ^xxrarred. .April
2nd; am I correct in my understanding, sir?

cm vour

Correct.
JUDGE

Okay. So I111 note your objection, but: I will allow 'them in.
will not be given very much weight. Okay.
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And they

FT u s

He was standing, legs aparr, 1 Ike this, on the. frame of the battery
rack. Picked up the plate, retaining plate and was striking the cover
repeatedly. He was mad, for what reason I couldn't tell, but he was
extremely angry about something. And 1 asked him to stop; he wouldn't
stop. And when I asked him to step again or I'd turn him in if he broke
the cover, he would—he went ahead and, f,go—go ahead, I don't give a
shit". He just, was in a bad. 'mood, that day, extremely bad mood.

HEJO3RS0N

At—You've testified what he sa^d, — i .'n. ^..^i.jui;, ..1 &\ -^)c pj^r/L. yoa
told h im to .step doing" that, did he at any point tell you he didn't
mean to do that, or -

ELLIS

Nb.

HENDERSON

Okay . AJ :d weuv yuj disqnmt li d at dJ I that ijj)1, Wfiie yuui lia\iiM m
. IracI
day or —

ELLIS

. No, 1 was having a gooc ajy„

HENDERSON

Okay. And your testimony was that he led asked,,, you approximately one
minute, earlier.

ELLIS

Uh-hmm.

HENDERSON

Ocxxl d „:i t have been f:i /e (5) m i i » ites or a re you fa i n! y sur c

KTIiTS

N o , - o t . a chai'O*^.

HENDERSON

Okay

EIULS

You ^ai; ask anybody in the 'warehouse, I doi 1 't take axteiriedperi ods of
time to get cut there and change a battery.
have XYJ further quest ions,,

HENDERSON

O-

JUDGE
SPENCER

Mr. Spencer?
Mr'. Ell is, when you, cone out of the washroom or—or wherever it was 'that
you were 'washing your' hands, in what relationship to the forklift and to
Mr. Fullerton is that roam?

ETJ.TS

I wasn't in 'the resfcrocxn, I was ii 1 the shop putting a load wheel in. I
just stood up, grabbed a towel, wiped my hands off, walked out into 'the
battery room, and;,, I was right there in the doorway when he walked i n,

SPENCER

Okay. At—at th i s time he had already changed the battery?
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ELLES

ru.g r ':t, When,

:*.-;•,**

.

> ;- .: i ,. xi.

. ,n.;

: ii'

a yeen ^

- .-^

it

ne

d i d n ' t put t > . _ i<-r/- in. continued t c ^eat on i t , I w a l ^ ^ to t h e bacK
of i t ? cause I J K I H ' T want t o act h i t - the face, with anvtinnq.
JUDGE

were a t the opposite r.ido of th*1

Okay- i<> xn the beginn:^
forklift.

FT •• . T S

JUDGE

Oka,
pro

u:.-.::, ^u-z.-x-r^y, when you : xrst came m .
» it-

1

t~^

t «~

ti*>i~ *"*: came in,

ry-

ELLIS
JUDGE

Okay - v>o you were at 'the north there, and then he 'was at the "west.

ELLIS
JUDGE

Then you moved fron the ncrth
then, vxs th

ELLIS

Right; uh -hen..

JUDGE

( .

KTJJ.q

He was -wou^or/i r^.* tn^ p^citt-

JUDGE

Okay,

ELLIS

1 QKiJdn't S « J h m feM

JUDGE

Okay.

ELLIS

But, ±.ike l sa,\
A
side tn the easr £id*

JUDGE

North to east, okay.

ELI1S

I'd seen him striking it, standing on the rail, already, from the north
side. And then when he wouldn't put trie plate in, I walked back to the
north side so that I wouldn't get ivt -Ith anything

JUDGE

Okav

SPENCER

No.

JUDGE

Okay.

\l.'\n
. er t* the east; and, between you,
ccrrectr

>

^i ^v

ti.

w^

;;?
, itt-JTg jt acnin.

^\.ld you «**=• ^ J T P
it (Jul i ^ r t l a i l a r

mintiW.,

i* s:^-.rvj irom the backside 'to 'the—from the north

Iliprii any! Innq flr-v yon hnvf

You, Ms. Henderson?
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HENDERSON

No,

JUDGE

Okay ,

Then, any other testimony that f s needed, do you need to recall

your witness?
SPENCER
JUDGE

Not at this time,

CLAIMANT

Okay, Anything else you,. wish to state?
Jast that I wasn't banging on the lift when he came ait. Arid, say, this
is the lift here, it's about this high, —

JUDGE'

Okay, that's to your' chest; and you're, what, about 5 - -

CI AIMANT

I don't understand how he th inks 1 :ie • ::a n s e e iny feet, i f hr*'1 m i 1h<>
other side of the lift, over' here.
He said ho CXMJ.1I In*t ,

CLAIMANT!

And I 'wasn't 'banging' on it when he came out. And I wasn't banging on it
at all. 1—-When he was on the other side, where he couldn't see my
feet, is when I slipped; and when I tried to regain my balance from
falling backwards, that's when T hit tn*-. plat*, or hit the plastic.

JUDGE

Okay. All right,
Ms, Henderson?

HENDERSON

Yes. The enployer contends that the c. •-.-*.. : *as '.u:^^/,.^ i_ JM%
cause, under—and has established. kncwlocijL, juipaoility and control,
Based on his prior incidents that had occurred, and the final incident
was cause for immediate dismissal. He did not provide this excuse that
he lost his balance at the time of the discharge, and Mr'. Ellis has
nothing' to gain by stating what happened. He's testified he saw him,
beating" on it and. testified what took place: after that. Eenefi ts should
remain denied, and the enployer' relieved.

JUDGE

II ian> *> • *u

SPENCER

We believe that the company has failed to meet their obligation to prove
just cause.
In 1990, there was an incident which played a part in
deciding the termination in this—this incident.
It also shows an
inconsistency on. a part of the employer 'whereas; it—the: enployer
contends that the claimant intentionally damaged company property in
1999 (sic), at that time he was suspended. Two and a-half (2 1/2) years
later", again, the—the enployer alleges that the claimant intentionally
inflicted damage upon company property. The claimant has stated that
the battery cover was already broken, that he slipped and fell and made
a small chip m ~~. And for the—those reasons and others, we believe

m g in dosing; m e n

I4i Spencer.

30

I hereby ceitity chat on tn- ^ \- ~jy of November,
i-bf-/ - . aused to be hand-delivered -one (<} original and seven
7) true and correct copies of the foregoing ADDENDUM TO BRIEF
,F' PETITIONER *::::
Utah Court, of AppecaS
230 South 50C Ear;* . #4 00
Salt Lake Citv
" «•' :""
and two (^ N caries mailed, port

I'KM

pi u p d

I

c

I lir fm

IOWMHI

7 6 69 South Sunrise Place
West :^ri :: *' -4 0 84
R. Paul Van Darr
Attorney Genera± .•*. j'.dii
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake Citv, - 84:14
Winston M. Faux, Esq
Attorney for Respondent, Board of Review
The Industrial Commission of Utah
Department of Employment Security
140 East 300 Sou' 1
P.O. Box 11600
Salt Lake City,
84147-0600

1832p
111092
2266-19

